Bank of Salt Lake v. Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2001
Bank of Salt Lake v. Corporation of the President of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints :
Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Carman E. Kipp; Kipp and Christian; Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Raymond W. Gee; J. Douglas Mitchell; Kirton, McConkie, Boyer and Boyle; Attorneys for
Defendant.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Bank of Salt Lake v. Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, No. 13704.00
(Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/867
LAW LIBRARY! 
OuC 17 1975 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF BUTA°lf,UN,«™ 
y A-u,tntram Law School 
BANK OF SALT LAKE, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
CORPORATION OF THE PRESI-
DENT OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS 
CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, 
a Utah corporation sole, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 
13704 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
An Appeal from the Judgment of the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
Judge Stewart M. Hanson, Presiding 
CARMAN E. KIPP 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN 
520 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
RAYMOND W. GEE 
J. DOUGLAS MITCHELL 
KIRTON, McCONKIE, 
BOYER & BOYLE 
336 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for 
Defendant-Appellant 
lata 
NOV!;.: 1974 
Cta;*k, Supramo COLIH", Ufcsh 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT 2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 2 
ARGUMENT 5 
POINT I 
APPELLANT HAD NOTICE OF THE FACT 
THAT KERRY - ALDON, INC, HAD AS-
SIGNED ITS ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE TO 
RESPONDENT 5 
POINT II 
AS AN AGENT OF THE APPELLANT 
CORPORATION, LELAND BRUDERER HAD 
APPARENT AUTHORITY TO RECEIVE THE 
NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT 14 
POINT III 
THE COURT BELOW CORRECTLY RULED 
THAT RESPONDENT SHOULD BE AWARD-
ED THE AMOUNT BY WHICH THE AC-
COUNTS EXCEEDED IN VALUE THE NOTES 
WHICH THEY SECURED 20 
POINT IV 
FAILURE BY THE BANK OF SALT LAKE TO 
SETOFF KERRY-ALDON'S DEPOSITS IN ITS 
ACCOUNT IN THE BANK AGAINST THE 
UNPAID ASSIGNED ACCOUNTS HELD BY 
APPELLANT DOES NOT BAR RESPOND-
ENT'S RECOVERY FROM APPELLANT 22 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 
Page 
POINT V 
ANY ALLEGED INACCURACIES IN THE AS-
SIGNMENT AGREEMENT, NOTICE OF AS-
SIGNMENT, OR INVOICES ARE NOT SUF-
FICIENT TO RELIEVE APPELLANT FROM 
ITS LIABILITY TO RESPONDENT 25 
Inaccuracies in the Assignment Agreement 25 
Inaccuracies in the Notice 26 
Inaccuracies in the Invoices 26 
CONCLUSION 29 
CASES CITED 
Boulevard National Bank vs. Gulf American Land 
Corp., 189 So.2d 628 (Fia., 1966) 29 
Cooper vs. Holder, 
21 Utah 2d 40, 440 P.2d 15 (1968) 11, 12 
Ertel vs. RCA, 307 N.E.2d 471, 
14 U.C.C. Reptr. Serv. 514 (Feb. 1974) 12 
Gateway National Bank vs. Saxe, Bacon and Bolan, 
336 N.Y.S. 2d 668, 11 U.CC. Reptr. Serv. 
668 (1972) 12 
Harrison vs. Auto Securities Corp., et al., 
70 Utah 11, 237 P. 677 (1927) 16, 17, 20, 23, 27 
Moab National Bank vs. Keystone-Wallace Resources, 
30 Utah 2d 330, 334, 517 P.2d 1020 (1973) 23 
Santi vs. Denver and Rio Grande W.R.R. Co., 
21 Utah 2d 157, 442 P.2d 921 (1968) 16 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 
Page 
Seaboard Finance Co. vs. Shire, 
111 Utah 546, 218 P.2d 282, 284 (1950) ....23, 24, 25 
Time Finance Corporation vs. Johnson Trucking Co., 
23 Utah 2d 115, 458 P.2d 873 (1969) -.6, 7, 8, 11, 14 
STATUTES CITED 
Section 1-201(27) Uniform Commercial Code 10 
Section 9-318(3) Uniform Commercial Code 5, 21 
Section 70A-1-20K26) and (27), 
Utah Code Annotated (1953) 8, 9, 11 
Section 70A-9-318(3), Utah Code Annotated (1953) 8, 26 
Section 70A-9-504(2), Utah Code Annotated (1953) .. 21 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
9 A.L.R. 181 24 
3 Am. Jur. 2d Agency § 76 17 
6 Am. lur. 2d Assignments § 96 5 
10 Am. Jur. 2d Banks § 666 23 
19 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 1164 15, 16 
19 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 1165 15 
3 Fletcher Cyclopedia of Corporations 60 
(1965 Revised Volume) 13 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 8(b) 16 
7 Zollman, Banks and Banking § 4472 24 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BANK OF SALT LAKE, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
CORPORATION OF THE PRESI-
DENT OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS 
CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, 
a Utah corporation sole, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
An Appeal from the Judgment of the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
Judge Stewart M. Hanson, Presiding 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case arises from the assignment by Kerry-Aldon, 
Inc. of certain accounts receivable to respondent Bank of 
Salt Lake. After the debtor, appellant Corporation of 
the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints made payments to Kerry-Aldon, respondent brought 
suit against appellants for recovery of the amounts as-
signed. From a judgment in favor of respondent, appel-
lant appeals. 
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DISPOSITION OF CASE I N LOWER COURT 
The court below awarded judgment to respondent 
in the sum of $59,205.80 plus interest and costs. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmation of the judgment ren-
dered by the court below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This lawsuit arose out of certain transactions which 
occurred during the years 1968 and 1969 between the 
plaintiff Bank of Salt Lake and the defendant Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and Kerry-Aldon Asso-
ciates (later Kerry-Aldon, Inc.). The basic underlying 
facts are these: During the years 1968 and 1969 the Cor-
poration of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-day Saints, Department of Seminaries and In-
stitutes purchased various items of furniture and equip-
ment from Kerry-Aldon Associates. The Bank of Salt 
Lake was financing the operation of Kerry-Aldon Asso-
ciates, having taken an Assignment of Kerry-Aldon's re-
ceivables from the L.D.S. Church as security for that 
financing (R. 13, Exhibits 2-P-C, 3-P-C, 4-P-C, 5-P-C). 
To assure payment on the accounts receivable and 
to protect its security interest therein, the Bank of Salt 
Lake sent four letters to a Mr. Leland Bruderer, Semi-
naries and Institutes of the L.D.S. Church, Union Pacific 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 (R. 171; 2-P-C, 
3-P-C, 4-P-C, 5-P-C). In substance these letters requested 
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Mr. Bruderer, on behalf of Seminaries and Institutes of 
the L.D.S. Church, to acknowledge the Bank's interest 
in various invoices, as granted by an Assignment from 
Kerry-Aldon Associates. On the bottom of each letter 
was an acknowledgement that provided: 
Seminaries and Institutes, L.D.S. Church, 
hereby acknowledges the indebtedness described 
above and agrees to the Assignment consenting to 
make all disbursements on the above invoices pay-
able to the Bank of Salt Lake and Kerry-Aldon 
Associates, jointly, and to mail such disbursements 
to the Bank of Salt Lake, 3081 South State, Salt 
Lake City, Utah. 
Seminaries and Institutes, 
L.D.S. Church 
Date: 
By: s/ Leland R. Bruderer 
Title 
Records & Budget Offices 
(Exhibits 2-P-C, 3-P-C, 4-P-C, 5-P-C) 
Those letters, together with the acknowledgements, were 
delivered to Leland Bruderer and he, in turn, signed them 
and returned them to the Bank of Salt Lake (Id.) 
Mr. Bruderer indicated in his testimony that at the 
time he signed the acknowledgements he was aware that 
the Bank of Salt Lake had taken an Assignment of the 
funds owing by the Church to secure the loans to Kerry-
Aldon, Inc. (R. 103). He further testified that he did not 
have the authority to direct how payment would be made 
on the invoices, but he also admitted that he did not 
inform the Bank of that fact at any time over the period 
that these acknowledgements were signed or any time 
thereafter (R. 104, 105). 
3 
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At the time he signed the acknowledgements Mr. 
Bruderer worked in the Budget and Records Office of 
the Seminaries and Institutes Department of the appel-
lant corporation (R. 99). His job required that he super-
vise the payroll; code expense documents; provide esti-
mates of costs incurred in furnishing seminary and insti-
tute buildings; prepare requisitions for such furnishings; 
and make recommendations for purchase of furnishings 
(R. 100, 101). 
Mr. Bruderer also testified that his recommendations 
on purchases were forwarded to the purchasing depart-
ment and it in turn would issue a purchase order gen-
erally following his recommendations. He apparently 
was hired by the Church for his expertise in this partic-
ular area and for that reason the Church generally fol-
lowed his recommendations as to purchase of furniture 
and equipment (R. 102). 
I t was in connection with his job that Mr. Bruderer 
frequently dealt with Kerry-Aldon which supplied vari-
ous materials to the Department of Seminaries and Insti-
tutes (R. 103). In fact, when Aldon Cook, a principal 
in Kerry-Aldon, was introduced to Bruderer by his then 
sales manager, Bruderer was presented as the man to 
talk to about sales "to the Church'' (R. 38). Under these 
circumstances, Aldon Cook informed the Bank of Salt 
Lake that the request for acknowledgement of the As-
signment should be directed to Leland Bruderer. The 
requests for acknowledgements were, in fact, so directed 
and Mr. Bruderer acknowledged the same (Exhibits 
2-P-C, 3-P-C, 4-P-C, 5-P-C). Following these events 
checks were issued on the invoices assigned to the Bank 
4 
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of Salt Lake by the Church, but made payable to Kerry-
Aldon Associates and not jointly to Kerry-Aldon Associ-
ates and the Bank (Exhibits D-24, D-25, D-26). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT HAD NOTICE OF THE FACT 
THAT KERRY-ALDON, I N C HAD AS-
SIGNED ITS ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE T O 
RESPONDENT 
The evidence in this case is undisputed that Leland 
Bruderer, an employee in the Seminaries and Institutes 
Office of appellant corporation, received notice of the 
assignment of Kerry-Aldon's accounts receivables to re-
spondent. 
It is well established that a debtor is liable to the 
assignee if after receiving notice of the assignment he 
nonetheless makes payments to the creditor/assignor. 6 
Am. Jur. 2d, Assignments § 96, states the rule as follows: 
In some cases it is stated broadly that an as-
signment of a chose in action is not complete, so 
as to vest title absolutely in the assignee, until 
notice of the assignment has been given to the 
debtor, . . . But generally if, after receiving notice 
or obtaining knowledge of the assignment, the 
debtor pays, or compromises with the assignor, 
he will not be protected as against the assignee. 
This rule has been codified in § 9-318(3) of the Uni-
form Commercial Code (§ 7OA-9-3180), UCA (1953)) 
which provides: 
The account debtor is authorized to pay the 
assignor until the account debtor receives notifi-
5 
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cation that the account has been assigned and that 
payment is to be made to the assignee. A notifica-
tion which does not reasonably identify the rights 
assigned is ineffective. If requested by the account 
debtor, the assignee must seasonably furnish rea-
sonable proof that the assignment has been made 
and unless he does so the account debtor may pay 
the assignor. 
It will be observed that the only requirement of the 
statute is that the notification ' 'reasonably identify the 
rights assigned/' Also, if requested by the debtor the 
assignee may be required to provide proof of the assign-
ment. However, neither the common law rule nor the 
statute gives the debtor the option of refusing to accept 
the assignment. 
The effect of this aspect of the rule can be seen in 
the case of Time Finance Corporation vs. Johnson Truck-
ing Co., 23 Utah 2d 115, 458 P.2d 873 (1969). There the 
assignor, Johnson Trucking Co., as security for a note 
had assigned its interest in proceeds from an insurance 
claim to plaintiff, Time Finance. At the request of the 
assignee an agent of the assignor went to the office of 
his insurance agent and informed him of the assignment. 
The agent then informed the claims department which re-
fused to place the assignee's name on the draft. Later the 
check was paid to the assignor who deposited it with the 
insurance agent for the assignee. Before the assignee 
could pick the check up the agency became insolvent and 
Time never received its money. Time then sued Johnson 
and Johnson cross-claimed against the insurer, Occi-
dental. Summary judgment was entered in favor of Time; 
Occidental was ordered to pay the judgment. 
6 
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On appeal Occidental argued that its agent was not 
within the scope of his authority in receiving notice of 
the assignment. The court rejected this argument saying: 
The essential issue is whether Occidental re-
ceived notice of the assignment of proceeds. When 
an obligee has acquired the right to receive money, 
it is his prerogative to assign it to whomsoever 
he selects; it is not essential that the debtor agree 
to the arrangement. When the obligor receives 
proper notice of the assignment he must honor it. 
If agent Mang received notice of the assign-
ment of the proceeds, then Occidental, the princi-
pal, received notification and was bound to honor 
it. 23 Utah 2d at 118. 
In the instant case the uncontradicted evidence is that 
Leland Bruderer was an employee of appellant who had 
dealt with Aldon Cook, the presenter of the notice, on 
numerous occasions. Among his duties were the follow-
ing: 
1. To coordinate payroll and benefits in the De-
partment of Seminaries and Institutes (R. 98, 100); 
2. To work in the Budget and Records office (R. 
99); 
3. To code expense documents (R. 100); 
4. To estimate costs in the building or funmhmu 
of seminary or institute buildings (R. 99); 
5. To prepare requisitions in furnishing or build-
ing institute or seminary buildings (R. 99); 
6. To recommend purchase of office and class-
room furniture (R. 101, 102); and 
7. To screen peddlers and salesmen from those 
who made the final decision as to purchases (R. 102). 
7 
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Notwithstanding the above facts appellant contends 
in Points I and II of its Brief that notice to Bruderer was 
ineffective in giving notice to appellant of the assign-
ment. This position appears to be based upon the mis-
taken premise that appellant corporation could disap-
prove the assignment and that only certain corporate of-
ficers had such veto power. Such a view is clearly er-
roneous in view of § 70A-9-318O), UCA (1953) and the 
Time Finance case which indicate that once the debtor re-
ceives notice nothing more need be done to perfect the 
assignment. 
Appellant further argues that notice to Bruderer was 
insufficient since he "had {never] been authorized in 
the past to acknowledge corporate indebtedness, {to} 
agree to and accept notice of assignments of corporate 
debt, or {to} draw and mail corporate checks on behalf 
of appellant/ ' Appellant's Brief at p . 14. In this regard 
appellant appears to equate those who can enter contrac-
tual obligations on behalf of the corporation with those 
who can receive notice. This position clearly contradicts 
statutes, case law, and the views of legal writers. 
The definition section of the Uniform Commercial 
Code contains the following passages. 
(26) A person "notifies" or "gives" a notice 
or notification to another by taking such steps as 
may be reasonably required to inform the other in 
ordinary course whether or not such other actually 
comes to know of it. A person "receives" a notice 
or notification when 
(a) it comes to his attention; or 
(b) // is duly delivered to the place of business 
through which the contract was made or at any 
8 
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other place held out by him as the place for receipt 
of such communications. 
(27) Notice, knowledge or a notice or notifi-
cation received by an organization is effective for 
a particular transaction from the time when it is 
brought to the attention of the individual conduct-
ing that transaction, and in any event from the 
time when it would have been brought to his at-
tention if the organization had exercised due dili-
gence. An organization exercises due diligence 
if it maintains reasonable routines for communi-
cating significant information to the person con-
ducting the transaction and there is reasonable 
compliance with the routines. Due diligence does 
not require an individual acting for the organiza-
tion to communicate information unless such com-
munication is part of his regular duties or unless 
he has reason to know of the transaction and that 
the transaction would be materially affected by the 
information. 
§ 70A-1-20K26) and (27), UCA (1953) {Emphasis 
added.} 
In the instant case the evidence indicates that Aldon 
Cook delivered written notice of the assignment to Leland 
Bruderer at his home and at his office (R. 171). The evi-
dence also indicates that Cook had dealt with Bruderer 
on numerous occasions in connection with sale of furnish-
ings to the Seminaries and Institutes Department (R. 10, 
38, 39, 42, 63). Under the provisions of § 70A-1-201-
(26)(a), UCA (1953) Bruderer received notice because it 
came to his attention. According to § 70A-1-201 (27), 
UCA (1953) notice to Bruderer is notice to appellant 
"from the time when [the transaction] is brought to the 
attention of the individual conducting that transaction,.. .** 
9 
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If the word ' 'transaction" refers to the receipt of 
notice, Mr. Bruderer was quite clearly conducting the 
transaction because he was the receiver. Similarly, if 
"transaction" refers to the various sales recited in the 
invoices, he was one of appellant's employees involved 
in these transactions as one who prepares requisitions and 
recommends purchase of goods. In any case, as the last 
sentence of subsection (27) makes clear, Mr. Bruderer's 
knowledge of the transaction and of the fact that the 
transaction would be materially affected by the notice of 
assignment clearly imputes notice to appellant. 
In this regard the official comments to § 1-201(27) 
of the Uniform Commercial Code contains the following 
pertinent language: 
27. This makes clear that reason to know, 
knowledge, or a notification, although "received" 
for instance by a clerk in Department A of an or-
ganization, is effective for a transaction conducted 
in Department B only from the time it was or 
should have been communicated to the individual 
conducting that transaction. 
Thus, according to the official Comment for subsec-
tion (27) appellant received notice of the assignment at 
that point in time when Mr. Bruderer should have "com-
municated {with} the individual conducting the trans-
action." Since most of the assigned invoices were not 
paid for periods ranging one to seven weeks after the 
assignments, (Exhibits 23-D, 24-D, and 25-D), Mr. Brud-
erer had ample time to communicate his knowledge of 
the assignment to the appropriate individuals. That he 
did not is attributable to appellant's lack of due diligence, 
not respondent's. 
10 
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Furthermore, § 70A-l-201(26)(b), UCA (1953) in-
dicates that the notices delivered to Mr. Bruderer's office 
comprise notice received by the organization or individ-
ual if the contract was made at the office or if the office 
was held out to him as the place where such notice could 
be given. 
While it is unclear where the contract for purchase 
of any particular item was made, it is clear that much of 
the concomitant negotiations and discussions occurred in 
Leland Bruderer's offices. Thus, it might be reasonably 
inferred that the contract for sale of the items was made 
in his office. Since two of the three notices were deliv-
ered to that office, appellant received notice by virtue of 
their delivery to that office. § 70A-l-201(26)(b), supra. 
The correctness of the above statements can be seen 
in Time Finance, supra, and other cases. In Time Finance 
notice of the assignment was presented to an insurance 
agent who worked in an agency affiliated with the debtor. 
There was no indication that the agent had been desig-
nated as one to whom such notice could be given; nor 
was he an agent or employee to whom authority had been 
given to acknowledge debts or to draw or mail corporate 
checks. Nonetheless the court's decision indicates that 
notice to the agent was sufficient, 23 Utah 2d at 118, 
even though the case was remanded for a determination 
as to whether the communication was notice of an assign-
ment or merely notice of the existence of a lien holder. 
(In the instant case there is no such ambiguity.) 
Similarly, in Cooper vs. Holder, 21 Utah 2d 40, 
440 P.2d 15 (1968) this court held that notice of 
11 
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an assignment of a municipal debt when given to 
the mayor was sufficient to bind the municipality. 
The city argued unsuccessfully that the mayor was not 
the proper party to receive notice because by statute only 
the mayor and city council acting together could approve 
"propositions to create any liability against the City." 
21 Utah 2d at 42. I t was also argued that notice to the 
mayor was improper since contracts to which the city 
was a party had to be signed by the city recorder. Id. 
Rejecting these arguments the court noted that while 
the policy decisions of the city were to be made by indi-
viduals other than the mayor 
there is . . . no policy decision to be made as to 
whether the City will pay what it owes for the 
services received. 21 Utah 2d at 42. 
The same reasoning might be applied to the instant 
case. For while it may be true that Leland Bruderer 
could not make decisions as to corporation affairs, he 
could receive notice of an assignment. The latter involves 
no policy making. 
Two further cases from sister states also deserve 
mention. In Ertel vs. RCA, 307 N.E. 2d 471, 14 U . C C 
Reptr. Serv. 514 (Feb. 1974) notice of assignment of 
accounts receivable which was sent by certified mail and 
received by a dock employee was held to be sufficient, 
even though the accounting department received no 
notice. 
In Gateway National Bank vs. Saxe, Bacon and 
Bolan, 336 N.Y.S. 2d 668, 11 U.CC. Reptr. Serv. 668 
12 
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(1972) notice of assignment of accounts receivable was 
held sufficient as against a law partnership where one 
partner received the notice. 
Finally, in his treatise on corporations Fletcher makes 
the following statement as to notice given to an employee: 
It would seem that the best test of imputation 
of knowledge is not whether the agent, whose 
knowledge is sought to be attributed to the cor-
poration is president, treasurer, and so forth, but 
whether the condition and facts known were within 
the sphere of the authority of the particular agent. 
3 Fletcher Cyclopedia of Corporations 60 (1965 
Revised Volume) {Emphasis added.] 
Among those agents to whom notice was given which 
bound the corporation, Fletcher lists the following: 
foreman in charge of work to which the notice or 
knowledge relates, . . . shipping clerk, claim agent, 
freight clerk, station agent, . . . trouble clerk, . . . 
a bookkeeper, . . . [and} purchasing agent. . . . 
Id. at 62,63, 64. 
In the instant case Leland Bruderer received knowl-
edge of the assignment, not by accident in a bar or cafe-
teria, but as an employee of appellant acting within his 
sphere of authority. His position in the corporation is 
closely analogous to a trouble agent, clerk, or purchasing 
agent. As such notice to him was notice to the corpora-
tion. Fletcher, supra. 
13 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT II 
AS AN AGENT OF THE APPELLANT COR-
PORATION, LELAND BRUDERER H A D AP-
PARENT AUTHORITY TO RECEIVE THE 
NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT 
Even if this court holds that only a few designated 
officials of appellant corporation could receive the notice 
of assignment, and that Leland Bruderer was not among 
them, it is nonetheless clear that appellant vested him 
with indicia of such authority sufficient to comprise ap-
parent authority. 
There appears to be no question but that an As-
signment was executed on behalf of Kerry-Aldon Asso-
ciates in favor of the Bank of Salt Lake and further that 
the Bank of Salt Lake gave notice of its Assignment to 
one Leland Bruderer of the Seminaries and Institutes of 
the L.D.S. Church. The only question that exists is 
whether or not notice on behalf of the Bank to Mr. 
Bruderer constituted sufficient notice to Mr. Bruderer's 
principal, the Corporation of the President of the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, so as to bind it under 
the terms of the Assignment and allow the Bank to seek 
recovery against said defendant for failing to abide by 
the terms of the Assignment. 
In regard to the payment by a debtor on an assigned 
claim, the courts in the State of Utah have held that once 
the debtor receives proper notice of the Assignment he 
must honor it. Time Finance Corp. vs. Johnson Truck-
ing Co., supra. Appellant argues that Leland Bruderer 
was without authority to receive such notice. Even if it 
14 
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were true that only certain officers could receive notice, 
Mr. Bruderer apparently had such authority. The gen-
eral rule as to the binding effect of acts of an officer or 
agent of a corporation on the corporation itself is found 
in 19 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations, § 1165: 
. . . [A] corporation is bound by the acts of its 
officers and agents acting within the apparent 
scope of their authority and if the officer or agent 
appears to be acting within his authority, the per-
son dealing with him is not charged with knowl-
edge of extrinsic facts making it improper for 
him to act in that case. Id. at 592 
This particular section of Am. Jur. goes on further to 
state that unless circumstances surrounding any particu-
lar transaction are of such a nature as to put a person 
dealing with an officer or agent of a corporation upon 
inquiry as to his actual authority, then such person shall 
not be bound to determine the exact nature of the au-
thority of such officer or agent of the corporation. 19 
Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 1165, pp. 592, 593 
Section 1164 of 19 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations, pro-
vides additional insight as to when a corporation may 
be bound by the acts of its agents, to wit: 
. . . {W]hen, in the usual course of the bus-
iness of a corporation, an officer or other agent 
is held out by the corporation or has been per-
mitted to act for it or manage its affairs in such 
a way as to justify third persons who deal with 
him in inferring or assuming that he is doing an 
act or making a contract within the scope of his 
authority, the corporation is bound thereby, even 
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though such officer or agent has not the actual 
authority from the corporation to do such an act 
or make such a contract. Id. at 591. 
These general rules have been recognized in the 
courts of Utah in the following cases: Harrison vs. Auto 
Securities Corp., et al., 70 Utah 11, 237 P. 677 (1927); 
Santi vs. Denver and Rio Grande W.R.R. Co., 21 Utah 
2d 157, 442 P.2d 921 (1968). In the Harrison case above 
cited the court stated the reasoning behind holding a 
principal responsible for the acts of an agent with the 
apparent authority to perform such acts: 
. • . {W}hen one of two innocent parties must 
suffer from the wrongful act of a third person, 
. . . the loss should fall upon the one who by his 
conduct created the circumstances which enabled 
the third party to perpetrate the wrong and cause 
the loss, . . . ( 2 5 7 P. at 679) 
The court in Harrison, as well as Santi, determined that 
when a third party deals with the principal's agent in 
good faith and it appears that said agent has authority 
to enter into a contract, etc., such third party should not 
be required to bear any loss that may result due to the 
lack of that agent's authority. That position has also 
been recognized by the Restatement (Second) of Agency 
§ 8(b), and comment thereto. 
Under the general law set forth above and recog-
nized by the State of Utah, it has been held that the prin-
cipal shall be estopped to deny the agency relationship 
where: 
. . . {A] principal has, by his voluntary act, 
placed an agent in such a situation that a person 
of ordinary prudence conversant with business 
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usages and the nature of the particular business 
is justified in assuming that such agent has au-
thority to perform a particular act and deals with 
the agent upon that assumption, the principal is 
estopped as against such third person from deny-
ing the agent's authority; he will not be permitted 
to prove that the agent's authority was in fact less 
extensive than that with which he was apparently 
clothed. 3 Am. Jur. 2d Agency § 76; cf. Harrison 
vs. Auto Securities Corp., supra. 
Plaintiff submits that based on the law heretofore 
cited and the facts of this case, the defendant Corporation 
of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
day Saints, should be estopped to deny that Leland Brud-
erer had no authority to execute the Assignments upon 
which the Bank of Salt Lake relied to its detriment. The 
facts of this case show that the defendant above-named 
had placed Leland Bruderer in a position of authority 
as an office manager with the Seminaries and Institutes 
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. In 
that capacity Mr. Bruderer was responsible for the requi-
sitioning and ordering of furnishings and equipment for 
all Seminaries and Institutes within the Church during 
the years 1968 and 1969. Mr. Bruderer had been hired 
for the purpose of making recommendations to the Church 
purchasing office as to what furnishings and equipment 
should be purchased. His recommendations were gen-
erally followed by the purchasing department. While 
acting in that capacity he had dealt with Kerry-Aldon 
Associates for the purpose of obtaining various items 
of furniture and equipment and had in fact ordered cer-
tain items from Kerry-Aldon Associates for the purpose 
of furnishing various Seminary and Institute buildings 
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owned or operated by the Church. I t was under those 
circumstances that the Bank of Salt Lake sent Mr. Brud-
erer certain letters with acknowledgements attached 
thereto which acknowledged assignment on behalf of 
Kerry-Aldon Associates of the various accounts receiv-
able from the Church to the Bank. Mr. Bruderer was 
aware that Kerry-Aldon Associates was obtaining financ-
ing from the Bank based upon those Assignments of ac-
counts receivables and in light of that, signed acknowl-
edgements of the Assignments and agreed that all pay-
ments under the Assignments would be jointly to Kerry-
Aldon Associates and to the Bank of Salt Lake. Further, 
Mr. Bruderer signed under the heading, ' 'Seminaries and 
Institutes, L.D.S. Church" and over the title "Budget and 
Record Offices.,, 
The Bank of Salt Lake was informed by Aldon Cook 
that the letters requesting acknowledgements should go 
to Leland Bruderer. That the Bank followed these in-
structions was evidenced by Exhibits 2-P-C, 3-P-C, 4-P-C, 
and 5-P-C, which were directed to Mr. Bruderer and he 
signed those acknowledgements over a period of approx-
imately three months. Mr. Bruderer testified that at the 
time he signed the acknowledgements he told Aldon Cook 
that he did not have any authority to sign them, al-
though he also testified that at no time did he inform 
anyone at the Bank of Salt Lake of that fact. Further-
more, he did not inform any other employee or officer 
of the defendant Corporation of the President of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints of the As-
signments to the Bank which had been acknowledged 
by him. 
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As a result of the foregoing, checks were made pay-
able to Kerry-Aldon Associates on various invoices that 
had been assigned to the Bank, but upon which the Bank 
was not named as a co-payee. The Bank became aware 
of this and sent another letter to Mr. Bruderer on October 
13, 1969 advising him of the appellant's failure to abide 
by the terms of the Assignment which the Bank had en-
tered into in good faith. (Exhibit 10-P) 
From the foregoing it is apparent that the Bank of 
Salt Lake, relying upon the representations of Aldon Cook 
and those of Mr. Leland Bruderer signing for the Semi-
naries and Institutes of the L.D.S. Church, advanced 
money to Kerry-Aldon Associates using as security As-
signments of accounts receivable owing to Kerry-Aldon 
Associates from the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints; that at the time those accounts receivable were 
acknowledged by Mr. Bruderer he was in fact responsible 
for the requisitioning and ordering of office furnishings 
and equipment for the Seminaries and Institutes of the 
L.D.S. Church; that all the invoices involved in this ac-
tion, the Assignments of which were given to the Bank 
of Kerry-Aldon Associates, were for furnishings and 
equipment used in the Seminaries and Institutes of the 
L.D.S. Church. 
Therefore, the appellant-defendant Corporation of 
the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
day Saints having placed Mr. Bruderer in a position of 
authority with the Seminaries and Institutes Department 
and having authorized him to order and requisition of-
fice furnishings and equipment for Seminaries and In-
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stitutes buildings clothed Mr. Bruderer with the apparent 
authority to execute the acknowledgement on behalf of 
the Seminaries and Institutes of the L.D.S. Church. 
Furthermore, the fact that Mr. Bruderer signed three 
acknowledgements over a period of approximately three 
months making no mention of any lack of authority to 
the Bank or anyone else, would seem to bring this case 
in line with the Harrison case cited above so that the 
loss should fall upon the party responsible for placing an 
agent in the position and clothing him with the apparent 
authority to perform the acts which caused the loss. In 
this case, the Corporation of the President of the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints did place Mr. Brud-
erer in that position and the Bank, having no other in-
formation, acted in good faith in dealing with Mr. Brud-
erer. 
Plaintiff therefore submits that the Assignment ex-
ecuted by Mr. Bruderer was done so with the apparent 
authority of the defendant the Corporation of the Presi-
dent of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints 
and that said Assignment is binding upon said defendant 
and that said defendant is liable to the plaintiff for any 
and all amounts paid to Kerry-Aldon Associates in vio-
lation of the Assignment of accounts receivable. 
POINT III 
THE COURT BELOW CORRECTLY RULED 
THAT RESPONDENT SHOULD BE AWARD-
ED THE AMOUNT BY WHICH THE AC-
COUNTS EXCEEDED IN VALUE THE NOTES 
WHICH THE SECURED 
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In its Point III appellant argues that the lower court 
committed reversible error in awarding to respondent 
the difference between the value of the accounts assigned 
and that of the notes which secured them. 
As support for this theory, appellant recites § 70A-
9-504(2), UCA (1953) which provides: 
If the security interest secures an indebtedness, 
the secured party must account to the debtor for 
any surplus, and, unless otherwise agreed, the 
debtor is liable for any deficiency. 
Appellant's position would, perhaps, have some va-
lidity if the Uniform Commercial Code prevented the same 
party from taking more than one security interest in an 
account, or if respondent had no security interest in the 
amount of the excess. However, neither of these condi-
tions are met here. 
Even a cursory reading of Article 9 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, particularly Part 3, reveals that more 
than one security interest may be taken in a single chat-
tel, intangible, account, etc. While it is true that in most 
cases different parties hold such interests, there is no 
prohibition on a single creditor holding more than one 
security interest in a single account. 
In the instant case it is clear from the evidence that 
the Bank of Salt Lake had a perfected security interest 
in all of Kerry-Aldon's accounts receivable, including 
the amount of the excess (Exhibit 6-P). Thus, in effect, 
there were two security interests in the accounts: The 
first, which was in the amount of the notes, was satisfied 
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by virtue of the lower court's decision that appellant's 
payments to Kerry-Aldon on the assigned invoices did 
not discharge appellant's liability to respondent. The sec-
ond security interest was thus in the balance of the ac-
counts. The court's awarding of this amount to respond-
ent was simply a judicial determination that this sec-
ond security interest in the balance of the accounts was 
valid and had priority over any other security interests. 
If appellant's objection to the lower court's decision 
goes to the propriety of the court's apparent finding that 
as to the excess respondent's interest was valid and prior, 
then clearly appellant lacks standing to make such an 
attack unless appellant is somehow asserting a security 
interest in the excess. Since no such assertion appears 
either in the record or in its brief, appellant is clearly 
an improper party to object to the lower court's award 
of the excess to respondent. 
Thus, not only was the lower court's determination 
proper, but appellant is not the proper party to raise 
the issue of impropriety. 
POINT IV 
FAILURE BY THE BANK OF SALT LAKE TO 
SETOFF KERRY-ALDONS DEPOSITS IN 
ITS ACCOUNT IN THE BANK AGAINST 
THE UNPAID ASSIGNED ACCOUNTS HELD 
BY APPELLANT DOES N O T BAR RESPOND-
ENT'S RECOVERY FROM APPELLANT 
In its Point IV appellant advances the novel theory 
that failure by the bank to exercise an alleged right of 
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setoff against Kerry-Aldon bars the bank's recovery from 
appellant. As support for its theory appellant points to 
the maxim enunciated in Harrison, supra, that as be-
tween two innocent parties suffering injury the one cre-
ating the circumstance which enabled a third party to 
cause the loss should bear the loss. 
The weakness of this argument is that it was ap-
pellant's failure to abide by the notice of assignment 
which created the opportunity for Kerry-Aldon to re-
ceive and dispose of the account proceeds. Any neces-
sity of offsetting Kerry-Aldon's deposits could only have 
been occasioned by appellant's failure to observe its duty 
once notified of the assignment. 
Indeed, it is clear that the bank was under no duty 
to offset. Regarding a bank's right to offset 10 Am. Jur. 
2d Banks § 666 states the following rule: 
It is a general rule that when a depositor is 
indebted to a bank, and the debts are mutual . . . 
the bank may apply the deposit, or such portion 
thereof as may be necessary, to the payment of 
the debt due it by the depositor, . . . [Emphasis 
added.) 
See also, Moab National Bank vs. Keystone-Wallace Re-
sources, 30 Utah 2d 330, 334, 517 P.2d 1020 (1973); 
Seaboard Finance Co .vs. Shire, 117 Utah 546,218 P.2d 282, 
284 (1950). It is thus clear that the Bank's right of setoff 
was not compulsory. 
Contrariwise, it is well established that failure to 
exercise the right of setoff cannot result in a bank's liabil-
ity: 
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This {right of setoff) is a privilege which the 
bank has; no case has gone so far as to hold it to 
be a duty owing by the bank to one primarily 
liable on the note to so apply the deposit. On the 
contrary, it has been expressly held that the bank 
is under no duty to the primary debtor to make 
the application. 9A.L.R. 181. 
There are good policy reasons for such a rule. Zoll-
man makes the following observation: 
Business would be very insecure indeed if a 
bank which held unmatured notes could at its 
option seize the deposit of the maker upon learn-
ing of his possible insolvency. It would thus with-
draw the very capital upon which the debtor relies 
to extricate himself from his insecure position. 
. . . If the rule were strictly applied, every such 
debtor compelled by slow collections to request 
an extension of his credits and unable to pay them 
at the very day of maturity would be at the mercy 
of the bank. Therefore the rule must be applied 
in accordance with the facts in each case. 7 Zoll-
man, Banks and Banking § 4472. 
In the instant case the facts indicate that Kerry-
Aldon's notes were secured by accounts held by a large, 
obviously solvent, corporation. It had received acknowl-
edgement from the corporation of the assignment. Under 
the circumstances the Bank's failure to offset appears rea-
sonable. 
Furthermore, this court long ago held that the right 
of offset is precluded where the security has not been 
exhausted. Seaboard Finance Co. vs. Shire, supra. In the 
instant case the bank had not exhausted the collateral 
24 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(i.e., the accounts receivable) at the time when it is al-
leged the offset should have been made. Therefore, it 
could not have offset against Kerry-Aldon's deposits. 
Appellant's final argument is that the doctrine of 
avoidable consequences required respondent to offset. 
Under the facts in this case such a view contradicts the 
rule set forth in the Seaboard case. In any event, while 
the doctrine may apply in the contractual setting, it 
should be observed that in the instant case there was no 
contractual relationship between appellant and respond-
ent. Therefore, respondent had no duty to appellant to 
mitigate damages caused by the corporation's failure to 
include respondent as a payee. 
POINT V 
ANY ALLEGED INACCURACIES IN THE AS-
SIGNMENT AGREEMENT, NOTICE OF AS-
SIGNMENT, OR INVOICES ARE N O T SUF-
FICIENT TO RELIEVE APPELLANT FROM 
ITS LIABILITY TO RESPONDENT 
Point V of appellant's Brief contains a potpourri of 
arguments, most of which concern alleged inaccuracies 
in the various documents relating to the assignments. For 
convenience these arguments might be lumped under the 
following headings: inaccuracies in the assignment agree-
ments; inaccuracies in the notices of assignment; and in-
accuracies in the invoices. 
Inaccuracies in the Assignment Agreement 
Appellant asserts that the assignment agreements be-
tween Kerry-Aldon and respondent do not specifically 
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list the account debtor (appellant), do not adequately de-
scribe the invoices evidencing the accounts, and do not 
indicate that Aldon Cook signed in his corporate capacity. 
Such an observation is irrelevant in view of the fact that 
appellant was given a notice of assignment which con-
tained the necessary information. In any case no privity 
of contract existed between respondent and appellant. 
Thus, only Kerry-Aldon has standing to attack the insuf-
ficiency of the assignment. 
Inaccuracies in the Notice 
Appellant implies that the respondent's failure to 
list Kerry-Aldon, Inc., rather than Kerry-Aldon Associates 
and its failure to correctly list Leland Bruderer's official 
title were fatal to giving appellant adequate notice. 
Section 70A-9-318(3), UCA (1953) states that notifi-
cation of an assignment is effective if it reasonably identi-
fies the rights assigned. Thus, failure to correctly list Le-
land Bruderer's position on the notice does not effect its 
validity. Furthermore, it is submitted that the naming of 
Kerry-Aldon Associates, rather than Kerry-Aldon, Inc., 
is not so confusing as to render the notice ineffective, par-
ticularly since the corporation was merely a continuance 
of the partnership and appellant had dealt with both. 
Inaccuracies in the Invoices 
Appellant further notes that at least two of the in-
voices listed in the various notices contained errors. In-
voice 1171, for example, is incorrectly listed on the notice 
as being in the sum of $34,966 when in reality the amount 
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was less than $100. A second invoice in the amount of 
$221 related to a transaction with a party unconnected 
to the appellant. Appellant asserts that it is not liable 
to respondent for these amounts. 
This position is incorrect for two reasons: First, 
through its agent, Leland Bruderer, appellant acknowl-
edged the correctness of the amounts listed as being due 
as proceeds of the invoices. The acknowledgement dated 
March 21, 1969, for example, reads in part: 
Seminaries and Institutes, L.D.S. Church, here-
by acknowledges the indebtedness described 
a b o v e . . . 
The portion of the notice referred to reads: 
Kerry-Aldon Associates . . . as consideration 
for credit extended to them by the Bank of Salt 
Lake has assigned the proceeds of invoice #1171 
in the amount of $34,966. 
A similar acknowledgement was made on the notice of 
March 7, 1969 concerning invoice #1137 for items sold 
to a third party. 
While admittedly the invoices described above were 
not as represented, it does not follow that the loss should 
fall upon respondent. On the contrary, the rule laid 
down in Harrison, supra, indicates that the loss should 
fall on appellant. As between the parties, appellant was 
in a much better position to determine the accuracy of 
the assignment, notice, and acknowledgement. As a third 
party to Kerry-Aldon's contract with the appellant the 
Bank had to rely on the appellant to inform it of any 
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discrepancies. Thus, it was appellant, not respondent, 
who created the circumstances which enabled Kerry-Aldon 
to cause the loss. 
Application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel 
leads to a similar conclusion. This court has adopted the 
following rule: 
'Equitable estoppel is bottomed upon the 
notion that, when one person makes representations 
to another which warrant the latter in acting in a 
given way, the one making such representations 
will not be permitted to change his position when 
such changes would bring about inequitable conse-
quences to the other person, who relied on the 
representations and acted thereon in good faith. 
* * * The representations made must be in 
themselves sufficient to warrant the action taken, 
and their sufficiency is a judicial question. . . / 
Farmers & Merch. Bank v. Universal C.I.T. Cr. 
Corp., 4 Utah 2d 155, 159, 289 P.2d 1045 (1955) 
quoting / . T. Fargason Co. v. Furst, 287 F. 306, 
310 (8th Cir.) 
In the instant case respondent received from one of 
appellant's agents an unequivocal acknowledgement of 
the debt described in the Bank's notice. The acknowledge-
ment gave no indication that the debts described were 
either inaccurate or contingent. Thus, appellant could 
reasonably foresee that respondent would rely on the 
acknowledgement and that respondent would continue 
to advance credit to Kerry-Aldon and to honor loans made 
to Kerry-Aldon in reliance upon those acknowledgements. 
For these reasons appellant should be estopped from now 
denying that the acknowledgement was accurate. 
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In an almost identical case the Supreme Court of 
Florida has held that an account debtor was estopped from 
denying an acknowledgement which read: 
Receipt is acknowledged of the above invoice 
and the assignment of this amount to Boulevard 
National Bank of Miami, and accordingly, payment 
will be made thereto, to Boulevard National Bank. 
See Boulevard National Bank vs. Gulf American Land 
Corp., 189 So.2d 628 (Fla., 1966), (the facts of the case, 
including the above quotation, are found in the appellate 
court's decision at 179 So.2d 584, 586 (Fla. App. 1965)). 
A similar result in this case would be consistent with that 
reached in Boulevard. 
In any event, allegations of inaccuracies in the in-
voices are irrelevant in view of the fact that the Bank 
subsequently took a security interest in all of Kerry-
Aldon's accounts receivable and that the amount awarded 
by the lower court did not exceed the sum of unpaid ac-
counts plus amounts already paid. Thus, appellant is not 
required to pay to respondent an amount greater than the 
value of the goods it received. 
Based upon the foregoing, the inaccuracies in the 
various documents mentioned by appellant do not form a 
sound basis for reversal of the judgment below. 
CONCLUSION 
The basic issue involved in this case is whether appel-
lant received notice of the assignment to respondent of 
Kerry-Aldon's accounts receivable. To contend, as appel-
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lant does, that Leland Bruderer was not sufficiently high 
in appellant's corporate hierarchy to receive notice of the 
assignment is to miss the essential point that such notice 
can be received by a larger number of employees than 
those who could bind appellant contractually. Leland 
Bruderer's prominent part in appellant's dealings with 
Kerry-Aldon certainly qualifies him as one to whom such 
notice could be given. 
Furthermore, appellant is estopped from denying or 
lacks standing to attack alleged inaccuracies in invoices, 
notices, assignment agreements, and acknowledgements. 
And in any case such allegations are irrelevant in light 
of respondent's subsequent filing of financing statements 
covering all of Kerry-Aldon's accounts. 
For these reasons the decision of the court below 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CARMAN E. KIPP 
of 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN 
520 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
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